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Felipe Monteiroe9176552018-07-16 14:39:55 -04001==================================
2Role-Based Access Control Overview
3==================================
4
5Introduction
6------------
7
8Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is used by most OpenStack services to control
9user access to resources. Authorization is granted if a user has the necessary
10role to perform an action. Patrole is concerned with validating that each of
11these resources *can* be accessed by authorized users and *cannot* be accessed
12by unauthorized users.
13
14OpenStack services use `oslo.policy`_ as the library for RBAC authorization.
15Patrole relies on the same library for deriving expected test results.
16
17.. _policy-in-code:
18
19Policy in Code
20--------------
21
22Services publish their policy-to-API mapping via policy in code documentation.
23This mapping includes the list of APIs that authorize a policy, for each
24policy declared within a service.
25
26For example, Nova's policy in code documentation is located in the
27`Nova repository`_ under ``nova/policies``. Likewise, Keystone's policy in
28code documentation is located in the `Keystone repository`_ under
29``keystone/common/policies``. The other OpenStack services follow the same
30directory layout pattern with respect to policy in code.
31
32The policy in code `governance goal`_ enumerates many advantages with following
33this RBAC design approach. A so-called library of in-code policies offers the
34following advantages, with respect to facilitating validation:
35
36* includes every policy enforced by an OpenStack service, enabling the
37 possibility of complete Patrole test coverage for that service (otherwise
38 one has to read the source code to discover all the policies)
39* provides the policy-to-API mapping for each policy which can be used
40 to write correct Patrole tests (otherwise reading source code and
41 experimentation are required to derive this mapping)
42* by extension, the policy-to-API mapping facilitates writing multi-policy
43 Patrole tests (otherwise even more experimentation and code reading is
44 required to arrive at all the policies enforced by an API)
45* policy in code documentation includes additional information, like
46 descriptions and (in the case of some services, like Keystone)
47 `scope types`_, which help with understanding how to correctly write
48 Patrole tests
49* by extension, such information helps to determine whether a Patrole test
50 should assume :term:`hard authorization` or :term:`soft authorization`
51
52Policy in Code (Default) Validation
53^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
54
55By default, Patrole validates default OpenStack policies. This is so that
56the out-of-the-box defaults are sanity-checked, to ensure that OpenStack
57services are secure, from an RBAC perspective, for each release.
58
59Patrole strives to validate RBAC by using the policy in code documentation,
Felipe Monteiro0170c992018-07-31 20:10:05 -040060wherever possible. See :ref:`validation-workflow-overview` for more details.
Felipe Monteiroe9176552018-07-16 14:39:55 -040061
62.. _custom-policies:
63
64Custom Policies
65---------------
66
67Operators can override policy in code defaults using `policy.yaml`_. While
68this allows operators to offer more fine-grained RBAC control to their tenants,
69it opens the door to misconfiguration and bugs. Patrole can be used to validate
70that custom policy overrides don't break anything and work as expected.
71
72Custom Policy Validation
73^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
74
75While testing default policy behavior is a valid use case, oftentimes default
76policies are modified with custom overrides in production. OpenStack's
77`policy.yaml`_ documentation claims that "modifying policy can have unexpected
78side effects", which is why Patrole was created: to ensure that custom
79overrides allow the principle of least privilege to be tailor-made to exact
80specifications via policy overrides, without:
81
82* causing unintended side effects (breaking API endpoints, breaking
83 cross-service workflows, breaking the policy file itself); or
84* resulting in poor RBAC configuration, promoting security vulnerabilities
85
86This has implications on Patrole's :ref:`design-principles`: validating custom
87overrides requires the ability to handle arbitrary roles, which requires logic
Felipe Monteiro0170c992018-07-31 20:10:05 -040088capable of dynamically determining expected test behavior.
Felipe Monteiroe9176552018-07-16 14:39:55 -040089
90Note that support for custom policies is limited. This is because custom
91policies can be arbitrarily complex, requiring that tests be very robust
92in order to handle all edge cases.
93
94.. _multiple-policies:
95
96Multiple Policies
97-----------------
98
99Behind the scenes, many APIs enforce multiple policies, for many reasons,
100including:
101
102* to control complex cross-service workflows;
103* to control whether a server is booted from an image or booted from a volume
104 (for example);
105* to control whether a response body should contain additional information
106 conditioned upon successful policy authorization.
107
108This makes `policy in code`_ especially important for policy validation: it
109is difficult to keep track of all the policies being enforced across all the
110individual APIs, without policy in code documentation.
111
112Multi-Policy Validation
113^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
114
115Patrole offers support for validating APIs that enforce multiple policies.
116Perhaps in an ideal world each API endpoint would enforce only one policy,
117but in reality some API endpoints enforce multiple policies. Thus, to offer
118accurate validation, Patrole handles multiple policies:
119
120* for services *with* policy in code documentation: this documentation
121 indicates that a single API endpoint enforces multiple policy actions.
122* for services *without* policy in code documentation: the API code clearly
123 shows multiple policy actions being validated. Note that in this case some
124 degree of log tracing is required by developers to confirm that the expected
125 policies are getting enforced, prior to the tests getting merged.
126
127.. todo::
128
129 Link to multi-policy validation documentation section once it has been
130 written.
131
132.. _error-codes:
133
134Error Codes
135-----------
136
137Most OpenStack services raise a ``403 Forbidden`` following failed
138:term:`hard authorization`. Neutron, however, can raise a ``404 NotFound``
139as well. See Neutron's `authorization policy enforcement`_ documentation
140for more details.
141
Felipe Monteiro0170c992018-07-31 20:10:05 -0400142Admin Context Policy
143--------------------
144
145The so-called "admin context" policy refers to the following policy definition
146(using the legacy policy file syntax):
147
148.. code-block:: javascript
149
150 {
151 "context_is_admin": "role:admin"
152 ...
153 }
154
155Which is unfortunately used to bypass ``oslo.policy`` authorization checks,
156for example:
157
158.. code-block:: python
159
160 # This function is responsible for calling oslo.policy to check whether
161 # requests are authorized to perform an API action.
162 def enforce(context, action, target, [...]):
163 # Here this condition, if True, skips over the enforce call below which
164 # is what calls oslo.policy.
165 if context.is_admin:
166 return True
167 _ENFORCER.enforce([...]) # This is what can be skipped over.
168 [...]
169
170This type of behavior is currently present in many services. Unless such
171logic is removed in the future for services that implement it, Patrole
172won't really be able to validate that admin role works from an ``oslo.policy``
173perspective.
174
Felipe Monteiroe9176552018-07-16 14:39:55 -0400175Glossary
176--------
177
178The following nomenclature is used throughout Patrole documentation so it is
179important to understand what each term means in order to understand concepts
180related to RBAC in Patrole.
181
182.. glossary::
183
184 authorize
185
186 The act of ``oslo.policy`` determining whether a user can perform a
187 :term:`policy` given his or her :term:`role`.
188
189 enforce
190
191 See :term:`authorize`.
192
193 hard authorization
194
195 The `do_raise`_ flag controls whether policy authorization should result
196 in an exception getting raised or a boolean value getting returned.
197 Hard authorization results in an exception getting raised. Usually, this
198 results in a ``403 Forbidden`` getting returned for unauthorized requests.
199 (See :ref:`error-codes` for further details.)
200
201 Related term: :term:`soft authorization`.
202
203 oslo.policy
204
205 The OpenStack library providing support for RBAC policy enforcement across
206 all OpenStack services. See the `official documentation`_ for more
207 information.
208
209 policy
210
211 Defines an RBAC rule. Each policy is defined by a one-line statement in
212 the form "<target>" : "<rule>". For more information, reference OpenStack's
213 `policy documentation`_.
214
215 policy action
216
217 See :term:`policy target`.
218
219 policy file
220
221 Prior to `governance goal`_ used by all OpenStack services to define
222 policy defaults. Still used by some services, which is why Patrole
223 needs to read the policy files to derive policy information for testing.
224
225 policy in code
226
227 Registers default OpenStack policies for a service in the service's code
228 base.
229
230 Beginning with the Queens release, policy in code became a
231 `governance goal`_.
232
233 policy rule
234
235 The policy rule determines under which circumstances the API call is
236 permitted.
237
238 policy target
239
240 The name of a policy.
241
242 requirements file
243
244 Requirements-driven approach to declaring the expected RBAC test results
245 referenced by Patrole. Uses a high-level YAML syntax to crystallize policy
246 requirements concisely and unambiguously. See :ref:`requirements-authority`
247 for more information.
248
249 role
250
251 A designation for the set of actions that describe what a user can do in
252 the system. Roles are managed through the `Keystone Roles API`_.
253
254 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
255
256 May be formally defined as "an approach to restricting system access to
257 authorized users."
258
259 rule
260
261 See :term:`policy rule`. Note that currently the Patrole code base
262 conflates "rule" with :term:`policy target` in some places.
263
264 soft authorization
265
266 The `do_raise`_ flag controls whether policy authorization should result
267 in an exception getting raised or a boolean value getting returned.
268 Soft authorization results in a boolean value getting returned. When policy
269 authorization evaluates to true, additional operations are performed as a
270 part of the API request or additional information is included in the
271 response body (see `response filtering`_ for an example).
272
273 Related term: :term:`hard authorization`.
274
275.. _Nova repository: https://github.com/openstack/nova/tree/master/nova/policies
276.. _Keystone repository: https://github.com/openstack/keystone/tree/master/keystone/common/policies
277.. _governance goal: https://governance.openstack.org/tc/goals/queens/policy-in-code.html
278.. _scope types: https://docs.openstack.org/keystone/latest/admin/identity-tokens.html#authorization-scopes
279.. _policy.yaml: https://docs.openstack.org/ocata/config-reference/policy-yaml-file.html
280.. _oslo.policy: https://docs.openstack.org/oslo.policy/latest/
281.. _policy documentation: https://docs.openstack.org/kilo/config-reference/content/policy-json-file.html
282.. _do_raise: https://docs.openstack.org/oslo.policy/latest/reference/api/oslo_policy.policy.html#oslo_policy.policy.Enforcer.enforce
283.. _authorization policy enforcement: https://docs.openstack.org/neutron/latest/contributor/internals/policy.html
284.. _official documentation: https://docs.openstack.org/oslo.policy/latest/
285.. _Keystone Roles API: https://developer.openstack.org/api-ref/identity/v3/#roles
286.. _response filtering: https://docs.openstack.org/neutron/latest/contributor/internals/policy.html#response-filtering